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The Republican Constitution of 1963, the Supreme Court and
Federalism in Nigeria
AKIN ALAO PhD.*
"Individual judgment and feeling cannot be
wholly shut out of the judicial process. But if
they dominate, the judicial process becomes a
dangerous sham."
Baron Parke in Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H.L.C.I (1853).
This paper specifically examines the constitutional changes of
1963 as the most important factor responsible for the redefinition and re-
conceptualization of the interrelationship of the Executive and the
Judiciary during the era of representative government and parliamentary
democracy in Nigeria. A careful review of the Nigerian political
environment, especially the zero-sum game of the First Republic, will
confirm that the Republican Constitution of 1963 was introduced, among
other things, to allay the fears of insecurity by the Prime Minister, bolster
the powers of the Executive, regulate Cabinet/Legislature relations, and
enhance the leverage of the Executive over the Judiciary through subtle
intimidation. The Prime Minister believed that Nigeria should review her
relationship with Britain to reflect her sovereignty and independence.'
This belief could not, however be divorced from the decision of
the Privy Council in Adegbenro v. Akintola2 and, of course, the highly
controversial build-up to the case.' It seemed that the Prime Minister felt
insecure in office due to the provisions of the 1960 Constitution that gave
the Governor-General wide discretionary powers to remove the Prime
Minister, as was the case in the Western Region between the Governor
and the Premier.4 The Government Sessional Paper of 1963, which
enunciated government proposals on the constitutional amendment,
contained a sentence that reflected the apprehension of the Prime
Minister:
The Prime Minister himself will not be removable from office by
the President unless he no longer commands the support of most
of the members of the House of Representatives as a result of a
vote of no confidence in the Government, secured on the floor of
the House of Representatives.5
* Lecturer, Obafemie Awolowo University.
1 Nig. House of Representatives, Legislative Council Debates (1963).
2 Adegbenro v. Akintola, 3 W.L.R. 12. (1963).
3 B. J. DUDLEY, INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL ORDERS POLITICS AND CRISIS IN NIGERIA 1-86
(Ibadan Univ. Press 1973) (detailing the political undertones in Adegbenro, supra note 2).
4 Nig. Western Region Const. (1960) § 33 (10)(a).
5 Nig. Govt. Sessional Paper No. 3 (1963) (containing proposals for the new constitution adopted by
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The recent experience of the Prime Minister of the courts in the
Doherty case 6 and his personal distaste for adversarial arguments based
on precedents and procedure aroused in him a need to revise the way
justice was administered.7 He believed in and felt safe with a practice
that would allow for the decisions of a wise man of honor rather than a
learned man who had impeccable credentials among his professional
colleagues.8 This formed the touchstone of the abolition of the Judicial
Service Commission as a body responsible for the appointment and
removal of judicial officers.9 Beyond the argument that the proposed
changes were on the grounds of "bringing the Nigerian practice in line
with what obtains in the United Kingdom," it could be seen that the
appointment of the Chief Justice by the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister was meant to be a clear warning to the Judiciary to
always defer to the Executive. Adetokunbo Ademola was right when he
said that the abolition of the Judicial Service Commission was enough to
encourage judges to dance to the tune of any government. 10
Pursuant to the same objective of enhancing the leverage of the
Executive over the other arms of government, the abolition of all appeals
to the Privy Council and the elevation of the Supreme Court to the Final
Court of Appeal on all Nigerian cases" within a context of constitutional
inferiority smacked of Executive tyranny.1 2 Section 120 of the
Constitution provided that "no appeal shall lie to any other body or
person from any determination of the Supreme Court." "The Supreme
Court was also allowed to retain its original jurisdiction in any dispute
between the Federation and a region and between regions.,
13
Kasunmu seems to miss the point when he supports the abolition
of the Judicial Service Commission by arguing that the attainment of
judicial independence should, in the final analysis, depend on the quality,
courage, and integrity of the individual judges, regardless of who
the all party at the Constitutional Conference held in Lagos, July 1963; see infra note 17).
6 Doherty v. Balewa,1 All N.L.R. 604 (1961).
7 Trevor Clark, A RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ALHAJI SIR
ABUBAKAR TAFAWA BALEWA 595 (Hudahuda Publishing Co. 1991).
8 Id.
9 Nig. Const. (1963) § 112 (1) (relating to judges of the Supreme Court of Nigeria); See also Abiola
Ojo, the panel on Nigeria since independence project Proceeding of the National Conference on
Nigeria since Independence 348-349 (J. A. Atanda and A. Y. Aliyu eds. 1985).
10 DAILY TIMES (Nigeria), Jan. 17, 1972 cited in A.B Kasunmu, The Supreme Court of Nigeria
1956-1970 10 (1977).
I1 Nig. Const. (1963) § 120.
12 The 1963 Constitution did not provide for judicial review of executive actions because judicial
power was not expressly granted to the courts. This was corrected, albeit inadequately, by the 1979
constitution.
13 Nig. Const. (1963) § 120.
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appoints them.14 The fact is, however, that the abolition of the Judicial
Service Commission would preclude the appointment of judges who
could be of high intellectual quality, courage and integrity. These
qualities according to Adetokunbo Ademola could be better discovered
and appreciated in any judge by the Judicial Service Commission. 15
Nwabueze was equally right when he described the Commission as an
"insurance against the injection of political and tribal considerations into
judicial appointments" in a pluralized society. 16 The analogy drawn by
the Executive with the English practice to justify the abolition of the
Judicial Service Commission was incorrect given that the decisive voice
in all English judicial appointments was that of the Lord Chancellor's
Department, which according to English traditions was far removed from
partisan politics. 17 This argument proceeds on the premise that the
constitutional changes with respect to judicial administration within the
context of enhanced executive powers of a more confident Prime
Minister affected the institutional safeguards of judicial independence
during the 1963-1966 period.
The abolition of the Judicial Service Commission according to
Adetokunbo Ademola was ill advised and in the words of W.O Briggs,
"the twin brother of preventive detention Act."18 Adetokunbo Ademola
believed that although the machinery of justice worked with many
wheels, the judge was the central figure in the scheme of things and it
was around him that the whole machinery of justice revolved. 19 The
judge occupied a unique position as the arbiter of rights and duties not
only between, citizen and citizen but also between the state and, the
citizen and in a federal constitution, between the constituent regions.20
The Chief Justice further contended that however good and however
democratic the constitution might appear to be, it had, in the last resort,
to depend and be greatly influenced by the quality of its judges, who
would interpret the Constitution. 21 "The more detached or impersonal the
judge, the more likely will the intention of the framers of the constitution
14 Kasunmu, supra note 10.
15 In person interview with Hon. Justice Adenekan Ademola (Feb. 14, 1995).
16 B.O. Nwabueze, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE NIGERIAN REPUBLIC 290 (Butterworths, 1964).
17 A.E.W. Park, The Constitutional Changes of 1st October 1963, Nig. L. J. 97 (1964).
18 W.O Briggs was an Action Group Politician representing Degema at the House of
Representatives. See Nig. House of Representatives Parliamentary Debates Vol. 13 2953 (1963); See
also Clark, supra note 7 at 601.
19 Adetokunbo Ademola, Personnel problems in the Administration of Justice in Nigeria, 5 L. and
Contemp. Probs. 27, 576-577 (1962).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 577.
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be realized., 22 It was therefore submitted by the Chief Justice that the
recruitment of judges should be left in the hands of a nonpartisan and
professional body that would be able to assess and appreciate the basic
qualities of a good judge.
Adetokunbo Ademola gave the following as the basic qualities of
a good judge:
a) Sound knowledge of the law. The judge must possess a sound
logical mind, which would help the assimilation and application
of knowledge of the law;
b) A good judge should be objective in assessing facts. A
judge should never allow his own personal feelings or his
own preconceived notions to displace facts which had been
proved before him;
c) Sound common sense. A judge must also be good on facts
and his assessment of facts that is, evaluation of the
evidence before him and deductions from facts. Common
sense is considered an indispensable factor in the attributes
of a good judge;
d) A judge should be humane. This attribute played an
important role in the relation between the Judiciary and the
public. The humane element in the administration of justice
had always strengthened the position of the Judiciary; and
e) Freedom from fear, prejudice or corruption.24
The Chief Justice submitted that modem constitutions provided
for the appointment, renewal of appointment, dismissal, general welfare,
and promotion of judges.25 In order to ascertain all these attributes, the
Judicial Service Commission was the best suited. The abolition of the
Commission was therefore seen as an attempt to expose the
independence of the Judiciary to gross abuse by the political class. As
noted by Clark, the Chief Justice could not be convinced of the reasons
why the politicians abolished the Judicial Service Commission and he
continued to plead with the Prime Minister and Premiers to reconsider
the decision and reconstitute the Judicial Service Commission.26 He
believed that the Nigerian politicians generally never sympathized with
any system that excluded their right to determine important state
appointments. "We cannot, therefore, but feel that in the years ahead the
appointment of judges by politicians may lead to what we call a packed
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 578.
25 Id.
26 Clark, supra note 7, at 600.
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bench." 27 Timing and the political turbulence of the period 1963-1966 did
not, however, allow for the fulfillment of this prophecy.
By September 1964, it was obvious that the executive was not
prepared to reconsider its stand on the abolition of the Judicial Service
Commission in spite of the general and overwhelming conclusion that it
was both deplorable and premature, considering the character and
features of the Nigerian Federal System. The Supreme Court and its
Chief Justice had to readjust to the new reality and this regulated or
moderated its relationship with the Executive. It is, however, feared that
considering the depth of the interpersonal relationship between the Prime
Minister and the Chief Justice,28 the public condemnation of the abolition
of the Judicial Service Commission by Adetokunbo Ademola was only a
professional duty. It would seem that the Prime Minister would never
contemplate any judicial appointment without an input of his friend, the
Chief Justice. In view of his recent experience with the courts, the Prime
Minister would seemingly prefer to deal with the Chief Justice in his
private capacity with regard to judicial appointments. The Judicial
Service Commission seemed too formal, independent, and difficult to
manipulate in carrying out the dictates and preferences of the Prime
Minister.
One recurrent, and perhaps serious, defect of both the 1960 and
1963 constitutions was the attempt to practice a Westminster cabinet
system in a supposedly federal framework plagued by ethnic, religious,
educational, and economic disparities. 29 Intra-class conflicts assumed
dangerous dimensions when such conflicts were presented and fought
deceitfully as inter regional hostilities and rivalries. The actual
manifestations of these rivalries undermined the objective base of the
artificial federal system because the apparatus of the Nigerian state
became structurally suspect. The political class, as composed in the
major parties and in shifting combinations and alliances, could not
resolve and arbitrate the differences among them; and this led to an
escalation of political disturbances in many parts of the country.30 These
were clear indications of the existence of a deep resentment against
government.31
A major cause of concern for some politicians of the first
republic, especially the opposition, was the existence of an arrangement
that gave a particular section of the country the opportunity to dominate
27 Id. at 643.
28 Clark, supra note 7 (detailing the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice).
29 Akin Alao, The Military and National Integration in Nigeria 1966-1979, Chapt 2. (1987)
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, on file with author).
30 B.J. Dudley, INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL ORDERS: POLITICS AND CRISIS IN NIGERIA 78 (Ibadan
Univ. Press 1973).
31 Id.
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Nigerian politics and central government.32 The Northern Region was
much bigger in total land area and in population strength than all other
regions, including the federal territory of Lagos, put together. In the
allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, the Northern Region
was allocated 174 seats out of the 312 seats. The Eastern Region had 73,
while the Western Region and Lagos had 62 and 3 respectively.33 This
inequality of a federal system that was created through the peculiar
process of devolution negated one of the conditions necessary for the
practice of a truly federal government.34 In the words of John Stuart Mill:
"There should not be any one state so much powerful than the rest as
to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If
there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the
... deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they
agree and whenever they differ, every thing will be decided by a
struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.
35
The fact that the ruling elite in the North was consciously using
the North's political weight to decide major issues and to promote
private political as well as economic interests at the expense of their
disparate Southern counterparts led to mistrust and suspicion.36 The
Prime Minister was more determined in using the Central might at his
disposal to redefine and rearrange the basis of the federal system; an
attempt that was seen as a clever design to entrench the domination of
the Northern oligarchy over the federation. It would appear that it was
the extent to which the judiciary, headed by Adetokunbo Ademola,
became involved in this design that provoked Ezejiofor's conclusion that
the crisis which ultimately led to the collapse of the First Republic was
the failure of the courts to "interpret the Constitution fearlessly,
impartially and liberally., 37 The Supreme Court and its leadership
became involved in the national question; an involvement which affected
public perception of its role as the final arbiter in constitutional matters.
As the Chief Justice of Nigeria, a statesman and confidant of the Prime
32 Id.
33 Oyeleye Oyediran, NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS UNDER MILITARY RULE 1966-1979
(Macmillan 1979).
34 For an articulate theoretical positions on the evolution, nature and character of the federal system
in Nigeria. See L. Adele Jinadu, Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in
Nigeria, 15 Publius J. of Federalism 2 (1985); see also FEDERALISM IN A CHANGING WORLD (R.A.
Olaniyan ed., Lagos: Office of the Minister of Special Duties 1988).
35 John Stuart Mill, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 367-368 (Everyman Doubleday, 1948).
36 For an analytical examination, see Oyeleye Oyediran, NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
UNDER MILITARY RULE 1966-1979 (1979).
37 Kasunmu, supra note 10, at 67 (citing Dr. G. Ezejiofor, A JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
CONSTITUTION: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE DURING THE FIRST REPUBLIC 67 (A.B. Kasunmu ed.
1977).
2001-2002 NIGERIA'S REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1963 97
Minister, Adetokunbo Ademola could not but participate in the effort to
arrest the drift of the state, as it were, to anarchy.3 8
The 1962 census controversy erupted 39 in the course of the
felony treason trial of Obafemi Awolowo and others that most people in
the Western Region felt was a political vendetta in an attempt to liquidate
the Action Group. The initial and unconfirmed figures had shown that
the South was more populous than the North; a claim the N.P.C rejected
immediately. The Prime Minister cancelled the 1962 exercise because
virtually everyone became a "willing liar of the first magnitude." A new
board, headed by Sir Kofo Abayomi was set up to produce a more
credible figure. The 1963 head count preserved the numerical supremacy
of the North over the southern regions. The Southern politicians,
however, had a "free for all" contesting the figures and after serious
negotiations, the Economic Council adopted the figures in May 1964.40
The appeal of Obafemi Awolowo and 17 others came before the
Supreme Court with Adetokunbo Adernola presiding and empanelled
with Lionel Brett, J.I.C. Taylor, Vahe Bairamian and Louis Mbanefo.
41
The accused persons were charged with three counts of the following
offences: felony treason contrary to section 41(b) of the Criminal Code,
conspiracy to commit a felony contrary to section 516 of the Criminal
Code and conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose contrary to section
518(6) of the Criminal Code.42 There is evidence to believe that
Adetokunbo Ademola had a prior knowledge of the case against Obafemi
Awolowo and his associates since he had the benefit of a privileged
discussion concerning the same with the Prime Minister. 43 According to
Trevor Clark, the Prime Minister had shown some of the impounded
firearms to Adetokunbo Ademola to convince him that the leadership of
the Action Group had indeed master minded a plan to overthrow the
central government through non-constitutional means.44
When the appeal in the case eventually came up before the
Supreme Court, it was wholly dismissed with respect to Michael
Omisade, Gabby Sasore, Samuel Akanbi Onitiri, Sebastian James
Umoren, Sunday Ebietoma, Lateef Jakande, Uzodinna Iroegbu
38 In person interview with the Hon. Justice E.O. Fakayode Ibadan (Mar. 11, 1996).
39 L.K. Jakande, The Trial of Obafemi Awolowo (Seeker Warburg 1966); Politics in Africa - 7
Cases (R.L. Carter ed., Brace and World Inc. 1966).
40 The figures were North: 29,177,986, East: 12, 388, 646, West: 10278,50, Mid West: 2533,337,
and Lagos: 675,352.
41 The Queen v. Omisade & 17 Others, N.M.L.R. 67 (1964).
42 Id.
43 Clark, supra note 7, at 555.
44 Id.
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Nwaobiala, Samuel Adesanya Otubanjo and Chief Obafemi Awolowo.45
The performance of Adetokunbo Ademola in the felony treason trial on
appeal at the Supreme Court was not a surprise to Obafemi Awolowo,
who believed that the Chief Justice was decidedly against him and his
party, the Action Group.46 Awolowo believed that the Chief Justice as far
back as October 31 1962 had confided in Adewale Thompson that
Awolowo would be arrested on November 2, 1962 and charged with
treasonable felony, convicted and sentenced.47 This confirms Trevor
Clark's claim that the Chief Justice had discussed the matter with the
Prime Minister and that the latter had a strong case against the leadership
of the Action Group.48 It further confirms our submission that
Adetokunbo Ademola seemed to have been convinced by the evidence of
the Prime Minister, and that he was prepared to allow the Supreme Court
to protect the person and office of the Prime Minister.
Michael Ornisade believed that the felony treason charges, trial
and the dismissal of the appeal wholly by the Supreme Court, were a part
of a grand design to eliminate any opposition to government in the
Federal Parliament.49 The Action Group provided a robust opposition to
the government side in the legislature. Obafemi Awolowo also referred
to an instance when Adetokunbo Adernola compared him to a man in a
village who thought it was his duty to oppose everything done in the
village.50 Awolowo seemed to believe that the Chief Justice and the
Prime Minister were too simple minded to know that in a dynamic
society and in politics, there was always something for thinking people to
oppose. He accordingly said:
However, the business of the opposition in a democracy was
something totally beyond the ken and comprehension of our
Chief Justice. Otherwise, he would not have spoken the way he
did. It were better if in future he kept his wits within the confines
of the Bench so as to avoid behaving like a fish out of water.51
From the above, it could be inferred that the Executive and
the Judiciary believed that the opposition was detrimental to the
unity and stability of the Nigerian State and to orderly conduct of
government business. The Prime Minister was a firm believer of
peaceful negotiation. According to his friend Adetokunbo
45 Omisade & 17 Others, N.M.L.R. (1964) at 99.
46 Obafemi Awolowo. ADVENTURE IN POWER: MY MARCH THROUGH PRISON 203-236 (Macmillian
Nig. Pub. Ltd., 1985).
47 Id at 204.
48 Clark, supra note 7, at 555.
49 In person interview with Chief M.A. Omisade Lagos (Aug. 4. 1994).
50 Awolowo, supra note 46, at 211.
51 Id.
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Ademola: "Sir Abubakar was a peace loving man and he accepted
the Prime Ministership of Nigeria with a view of establishing peace,
unity and love among the several tribes and peoples of Nigeria.1
52
The Federal Election of 1964, which was characterized by the
alliance of strange bedfellows, mutual distrust and boycotts, created "a
lot of tension and upheaval." The President, Dr. Nnarndi Azikwe, was
obviously disturbed about the state of the nation in 1964 when he
confided to an interviewer on his 60th birthday that, "what is happening
in Nigeria today does not inspire me to be optimistic that we shall
survive as a nation. 5 3 The Northern Peoples' Congress and the Nigerian
National Democratic Party formed the Nigerian National Alliance. The
National Council of Nigerian Citizens and the Action Group became the
United Peoples Grand Alliance. UPGA lost faith in the ability of the
electoral body to organize a free and fair election devoid of persecution
and intimidation of political opponents, especially in the Northern
Region. 4 It therefore decided to boycott the elections. The NNA was
sure of electoral victory and therefore went ahead and held the elections
as scheduled. The boycott was effective and absolute in the Eastern
Region and some parts of the Western Region. The Mid Western Region
belatedly participated when the Premier Sir Dennis Osadebay realized
that the boycott would improve the chances of the NNA candidates at the
polls.55 The haphazard conduct and participation in the elections raised
the question of credibility, especially when the Chairman of the Electoral
Body had cause to resign his appointment.
56
On December 30, 1964, elections were held in the Northern
Region, in many parts of the West and in some parts of the Mid West.
They were completely boycotted in the East.57 The results that were
eventually released showed that the N.N.A. had won 190 seats and the
U.P.G.A only 40 seats.58 Many people called for the cancellation of the
elections and urged President Nnamdi Azikiwe to assume executive
powers, nominate a caretaker government under a Prime Minister of his
choice and later hold a new and more credible election. 59 Tafawa Balewa
52 Clark, supra note 7, at VIII.
53 Id.
54 For details, see Olav Stokke, INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION: THE CASE OF THE NIGERIAN
FEDERATION UP TO JUNE 1967 24 (Scandinavian Inst. of Afr. Studies 1970).
55 J.D. Ojo, CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN NIGERIAN, LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH AFRICAN (Sept. 1995).
56 Sir Kofo Abayomi resigned as both the Chief Electoral Commission and Chairman of the Federal
Electoral Commission on April 1964.
57 Stokke, supra note 54.
58 Id.
59 Clark, supra note 7, at 698.
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on the other hand, strongly believed that the results of the elections were
truly reflective of the political preference of the majority of Nigerians.
On January 1, 1965, the President informed the Prime Minister that the
elections were "unsatisfactory in view of the violations of freedom of
recent weeks., 60 The President believed that the results of the elections
could not be relied upon in calling up a new Parliament and that he had
no intention of appointing Tafawa Balewa or any person to form a
government. 61 Azikiwe further said he would prefer to resign as
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria rather than to accept the
results of the elections. 62 The Prime Minister responded that he was still
the Prime Minister until a new one was appointed within the provisions
of the Constitution.6' He believed that the clear majority votes of the
NNA votes gave the President no alternative other than to reappoint him.
He concluded that, if the President was not prepared to carry out the duty
of his office, he should resign.64
It was in the thick of this national crisis that Adetokunbo
Ademola became involved in finding a workable solution to the impasse.
The Prime Minister confided in Adetokunbo Ademola his intention to
appoint Sir Kofo Abayomi to succeed Azikjwe as President.65
Adetolcunbo Ademola, however, disabused his mind and assured him
that Nnamdi Azikiwe would not resign.66 The President had wanted to
call in the Armed Forces and the Police to strengthen his bargaining
position vis a vis the Prime Minister's.
67
At a joint meeting with Major-General Welby-Everard,
Commodore J.R.A. Wey and Mr. Orok Edet, the Inspector General of
Police, the President sought to secure the allegiance and loyalty of the
Forces.68 It was, however, at this stage that he called for legal advice as
to which office the Forces should pledge their loyalty. It would seem that
the constitutional interpretation that was provided by Mr. Justice Lionel
Brett of the Supreme Court was with the fore knowledge and
concurrence of Adetokunbo Ademola.69 It was submitted that the
Constitution gave the Federal Parliament sole powers to legislate for the








67 Id. at 699.
68 Id. at 700.
69 Id.
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wielded by the Army Council and the Navy Board. They were both
responsible to the Minister of Defense. The operational control of the
Forces was said to be by the commanders who were under the policy
direction of the cabinet. With respect to the maintenance of public safety
70and order, the direction was to come from the Prime Minister.
This legal position emphasized the figurehead position of the
President who had no operational control or command over the Forces.
The position of the law on the matter was conveyed to the President on
Sunday 3 January 1965 by Adetokunbo Ademola and Louis Mbanefo
and with a six-point proposal on how best to resolve the crisis. The six
points as proposed were:
(i) reaffirmation of the federal unity of Nigeria, with equal
opportunities and no oppression;
(ii) strict observance of the constitution till it is properly
amended;
(iii) a broad based national government formed on the
declared election results to avoid chaos;
(iv) detailed legality of the election to be determined by the
courts and the constituency results upheld, except where
the small turn-out had made an obvious mockery and
common sense required a re-run;
(v) a one-year eleven man commission to be set up within
six months, to review the constitution and electoral
machinery with a view to a constituent assembly (the
President to nominate a member and the Prime Minister
and Premiers two each); and
(vi) the Western government to be dissolved to allow a free
expression of regional electoral will.
71
In spite of the uncompromising position of the activists who
surrounded him, President Nnarndi Azikiwe, on Monday 4 January,
called on Tafawa Balewa to form a government on the basis of the 1964
electoral results.72 In his acceptance speech, the Prime Minister said inter
alia: "The President and I have once again showed [sic] that the things
that bind us together are much stronger than those that sometimes divide
us... it is my intention to try and form a broadly based (SIC) government
that will cater for all our peoples. 73
Between 1963 and 1966, the fragility of the Nigerian federation
was quite apparent. 74 The Chief Justice became involved in the resolution
70 Id.
71 Id. at 701.
72 Id. at 703.
73 Id.
74 Oyeleye Oyediran believed that all that happened between 1962 and 1966 were signposts to
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of the national crisis. His performance as head of the Judiciary could
therefore be understood in view of his avowal to use the agency of the
courts, especially the Supreme Court to ensure the survival of the
Federation. The political situation and circumstances of the period called
for enlightened self-restraint and not judicial activism. As noted by
Cardozo, the Chief Justice could not help but be influenced by prevailing
values7" and in the words of Wright, "value choice is the most important
function of the Supreme Court, because of constitutional causes., 7 6 This
would be better determined when judges prefer a process of selecting
values to one of constructing and articulating principles.77 Adetolcunbo
Ademola believed that the problem of the country was how to meld
together the diverse ethnic groups and bring about a balance between
national unity and regional autonomy. 78 The Constitution, which
Ademola described as a piece of African art in its detailed simplicity,
79
would in his opinion only succeed if the politicians approached it with
care and tolerance and the judges with prudence and restraint. The Bench
in Nigeria must always be aware of the "peculiar Nigerian circumstance
and situations while considering constitutional issues and allowance must
be made for spatial and historical differences," which according to
Adetokunbo Ademola while commenting on the Nigerian situation
during the First Republic noted that:
Much had been said about the liberal method of interpretation,
but one must remember that conditions are different from
country to country and whilst therefore judicial interpretations in
Nigeria may not necessarily follow those of other countries, it
was to be hoped that courts would evolve their own distinct
jurisprudence. 80
The case Attorney-General Western Nigeria v. African Press
Ltd. and Ayo Ojewunmi, provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court,
presided over by Chief Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, to make more
definitive pronouncements on sedition. The facts of the case were as
follows: the Director of Public Prosecutions Western Region initiated
criminal proceedings against African Press Ltd. and Ayo Ojewunmi in
the name of the Attorney General for the Western Region. The following
disaster.
75 Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press 1925) 1921.
76 Robert H. Borke, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 5
(1971).
77 d.
78 Constitutional Problems of Federation in Nigeria, Record of Proceedings of a Seminar Held at
Kings College, Lagos 8-15 August 1960 134 (Lionel Brett ed.).
791d. atV.
80 -d.
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charges were preferred against them:81
(i) Publishing seditious publication contrary to section
47(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, Cap 28, Laws of the
Western Region of Nigeria, 1959.
(ii) Publication of false news with intent to cause fear and
alarm or to disturb public peace contrary to section 54(1)
of the Criminal Code, Cap 28, Laws of the Western
Region of Nigeria, 1959.
(iii) Publication of defamatory matters contrary to section
316 of the Criminal Code, Cap 28, Laws of Western
Region of Nigeria, 1959.82
Relying on the Republican Constitution of 1963, which placed
the Director of Public Prosecutions under the Attorney General, the
respondents at the lower court submitted that the Crown could not prove
that the Attorney-General's written consent, a prerequisite, had been
obtained before the prosecution was initiated.83 The lower court acquitted
the respondents, despite reference to Western Nigeria Legal Notice 293
of 1963 giving a general consent of the Attorney-General to the Director
of Public Prosecutions, the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, and
all grades of State Counsel in the Department of Public Prosecutions.
When the case came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Adetokunbo Ademola was concerned with the policy implications of the
case, and perhaps more importantly by the political climate of the
Western Region in particular and the country in general. Relying on the
1962 Second Amendment to the Constitution as contained in section 47
(1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria,84 the Chief
Justice held that the Respondents' argument that the power to institute
proceedings differed from the duty of giving consent and that the latter
could only be personal and could not be delegated was a
misunderstanding of the constitution. 85 Accordingly the Chief Justice
said: "The Attorney-General may exercise the power to institute criminal
proceedings which the constitution of the Region gives him in any case
in which he considers it desirable to do so, and in exercising it he is not
subject to the control of any other person or authority. 86
With reference to the clause disallowing the intervention of any
court of law in the proper exercise of the powers of the Attorney General
to delegate his or her powers, Adetokunbo Ademola acquiesced that:
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"The question whether in instituting these proceedings, the
Director of Public Prosecutions was acting in accordance with
any instructions he may have received from the Attorney General
has no bearing on the question of whether the proceedings were
validly instituted and is not one into which the court can
inquire.
' 87
It was therefore declared that:
Generally, there is no need for a Judge to know what instructions
the Attorney General has given to the Director of Public
Prosecutions in regard to the conduct of a case and the courts
must normally take it for granted that if the Director of Public
Prosecutions begins a prosecution under section 47 of the
Criminal Code, he has done so in accordance with instructions
given him by the Attorney General.... 88
Commenting on the case under review, Ijalaye contends that the
Supreme Court sat on the fence when it had the opportunity to review the
rules of evidence relating to the exclusion of evidence on grounds of
state privilege. 9 It would seem, however, that the Chief Justice was,
above all, concerned about the stability of the country at the material
time. Sedition was an obstacle to healing the wounds of the country.
Indeed, the African Press Ltd. case was the only criminal case that called
for a decision of the Court on privilege claims of the state under section
219 of the Evidence Act.90
The restrictive interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme
Court and the fear that it had compromised its separateness and
independence as an arm of government affected the confidence of the
people in the court as protector of individual liberty, rights, and
privileges. 91 As noted by S. S. Ogan, the number of constitutional cases
that came up for determination by the Supreme Court reduced in number
progressively from 1963 to 1965. He believes that the reduction in
number was a clear indication that the public had lost confidence in the
ability of the courts to settle constitutional disputes impartially.
92
It could however be argued that the reduction in the number of
constitutional cases was the result of a combination of factors. In the first
instance, by 1963 the federal government had succeeded in assuming a
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183 (A.B. Kasunmu ed. 1977).
90 Id.
91 S.S. Ogan, History of the Supreme Court of Nigeria 268 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
on file with the University of Ibadan).
92 Id.
2001-2002 NIGERIA'S REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1963 105
position of leverage over the regions and had penetrated the Western
Region, the hot bed of opposition to its rule.93 The leader of the
opposition and his lieutenants in the regional and Federal Houses of
Assembly had been silenced.
The Supreme Court under Ademola became characterized as
over-protective of the interest of the Federal government. His extra
judicial activities during this period confirmed that he was very close to
the Prime Minister and would not mind using his position as Chief
Justice of Nigeria to protect the interest of the government led by his
friend and soul mate. The personnel of the Court became involved in
hotly partisan matters such as giving political advice to political actors.94
The political climate was not conducive to constitutional litigations, as
the business of government was conducted on the basis of political
bargaining, compromise, mutual and ethnic mistrust and suspicion. 9 The
preferred position of the Prime Minister was to give as little recourse to
the courts as possible, and this appeared to have been appreciated by
Adetokunbo Ademola.96
The Western Regional election of October 11, 1965 was a
landmark in the history of federalism and political party activities in
Nigeria.97 The various political parties were all interested in the outcome
of the elections as the political stakes were high. The political
calculations were that, if the NNDP won, the AG would probably
collapse and the NCNC would then be isolated in a federation
completely dominated by the Northern Region and its leadership. If the
AG defeated the NNDP, all three Southern Regions (East, Midwest, and
West) would then be under parties opposed to the NPC. By acting
together, they might be able to cause sufficient political upheavals to
force the federal government 98 to conduct a new round of general
elections which they might possibly win.
Adetokunbo Adernola's support for the NNDP through the Egbe
Ornn Olofin was well known. 9 9 The election was characterized by
electoral fraud of frightening proportions in order to secure victory for
the NNDP.100 Some electoral officers disappeared or refused to accept
nomination papers of opposition candidates, thereby declaring NNDP
candidates unopposed. Ballot papers were widely found on unauthorized
93 Douglas A. Anglin, Brinkmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Election of 1964-1965, XX Int'l. J.
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persons on election day, and some returning officers refused to declare
the result of the polls after their count so false returns could be made
from the regional capital.1 °l The Chairman of the Electoral Commission
resigned in protest and declared that he had no confidence in the conduct
of the elections.
10 2
The Federal Government for inordinate political reasons became
most insensitive to the situation in the Western Region. In spite of public
outcry, the NNDP went on the air, through the federal government
owned radio network, to declare its victory in 73 out of the 94 seats."0 3
These returns were transmitted to the Governor of the West, Sir Odeleye
Fadahunsi, who immediately called on S.L. Alcintola to form a new
government in the Western Region. 10 4 The rump of the Action Group, led
by Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro, were arrested and charged for illegal
assumption of office.10 5 The supporters of the AG felt that the injustice
was so unbearable, that it led to a complete break down of law and order
in the region. 10 6 Moreover, farmers saw the cut in guaranteed price of
Cocoa from £120 to £65 as an attempt by the Premier S.L. Akintola and
the Northern dominated Federal Government to repress them politically
and economically. 
107
The Federal Government watched the mounting tension but
remained generally indecisive. Some observers however believe that the
Federal Government was waiting for the crisis to escalate to a point that
would justify the use of the armed forces as an army of occupation in the
Western Region. 108 The coup of January 15, 1966, led by Major K.C.
Nzeogwu pre-empted the Federal Government' plan to use the army in
the West.' 9
In fact, it is believed that January 15, 1966, became the D. Day
because Major K.C. Nzeogwu and his collaborators were aware of the
intention of the central government to use the army to settle a sectional
and political cause in the Western Region." 0
From an analytical class perspective, the January 15, 1966 coup
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that ended the life of the First Republic was a result of zero-sum-game
politics, compounded by a winner-take-all strategy.11' The Nigerian
political class competed amongst themselves for access to the corridors
of power and by extension the acquisition of substantial wealth.' 12 The
federal state structure was not founded on any enduring principle; the
institutions of state including the judiciary were not prepared or equipped
to resolve deeply rooted structural conflicts and contradictions.1 3
Adetokunbo Ademola thought that the judiciary's role was
independent to the extent that it could not be said that the Supreme Court
was under the control of the executive. It is obvious, however, that the
Chief Justice failed or pretended not to see the thinly disguised
maneuvers of the Prime Minister to build up the powers of the central
government at the expense of the regions, and to ensure the protection of
the political interest of the NPC by all the institutions of state including
the Judiciary.
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